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ABSTRACT
The convergence and divergence among Europe, Asia and Africa about the Mediterranean as 
a geopolitical center, and the end of the cold war, are shaping a new continental security zone: 
Eurasia.  Currently, this scene of conflict is witnessing wars with different features and characte-
ristics, such as ethnicity and religion; interstate or global security concerns -as is the case of Iraq, 
Iran and Afghanistan; and border conflict as was the case between Georgia and Russia for the 
independence of South Ossetia.  Control of this area means global domination of population and 
provision of energy during this century.
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RESUMEN
La convergencia y la divergencia entre Europa, Asia y África sobre el Mediterráneo como centro 
geopolítico, y el fin de la guerra fría, están dando forma a una nueva zona de seguridad continen-
tal: Eurasia. En la actualidad, este escenario de conflicto es testigo de guerras con características 
diferentes, tales como el origen étnico y la religión; Preocupaciones de seguridad interestatales o 
mundiales como es el caso de Irak, Irán y Afganistán; y el conflicto fronterizo como fue el caso entre 
Georgia y Rusia y la independencia de Osetia del Sur. El control de esta área significa dominación 
de la población mundial y el suministro de energía durante este siglo.
Palabras clave: Geopolítica, Europa, Asia, el conflicto internacional.
RESUMO
A convergência e divergência entre a Europa, Ásia e África sobre o Mediterrâneo como um centro 
geopolítico, eo fim da guerra fria, estão moldando uma nova zona de segurança continental: Eurásia. 
* Raul Netzahualcoyotzi, is an international Relations professor at the Faculty of Law and social Sciences at the Autonomous University of Puebla 
(BUAP), Mexico and co-author of “The Chinese economy in the region to the international stage”
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Atualmente, este cenário de conflito está a assistir a guerras com diferentes características, tais 
como etnia e religião; interestadual Preocupações ou segurança global, como Iraque, Irã e Afe-
ganistão, e do conflito fronteiriço, como foi o caso entre a Geórgia ea Rússia, a independência da 
Ossétia do Sul. O controle dessa área significa a dominação da população mundial e fornecimento 
de energia durante este século.
Palavras-chave: Geopolítica, Europa, Ásia, Conflitos Internacionais.
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THE COLD WAR TWILIGHT AND THE 
NEW INTERNATIONAL ACTORS
In the introduction of Paul Kennedy’s Preparing 
for the Twenty-first Century, he states that in the 
nineties the discussion on how international actors 
could behave in geopolitics was retaken, as a result 
of the Cold War twilight. A unipolar world and a 
single hegemony were assumed without questions. 
Without world crisis on course, all the problems 
came from the periphery, never the center.
Therefore, the debate in this book is focused in 
the transnational forces, the environment issues, 
the growth population, environmental degradation 
and the effects in the economic growth, as well 
as the increase in international trade, but above 
all the spectacular technology advances (in other 
works this sum of new phenomena was called 
globalization); it was no longer necessary to think 
in a new multipolar world, in the possible changes 
or studying the new nature of the social economic 
or political forces. 
To the United States preeminence, the orientation 
was that a strategist of this country (Brzezinski, 
2005:11) took an historic decision, this country will 
try, by all means, to dominate the world o to lead it?
In essence, this power was linked to global security 
problems, although it was recorded that Americans 
felt unsecure despite being the generators of in-
terdependence, where ideas of cooperation and 
competition could maintain a status of the single 
hegemonic power to this country.
The central argument of this author, about the role 
of the United States in the world, is simple: the 
American power, while it can assert its sovereignty 
as a dominant nation is, today, guarantee in last 
instance of the global security.
In contradiction, parallel the American society sti-
mulates social tendencies of global reach, thinning 
the national and traditional sovereignty.
Coupled, power and American social dynamics may 
encourage the gradual emergence of a global eco-
nomy of shared interests. Misused and confronted 
each other, could drive the world upon the chaos 
and submerse the United States in a situation of 
continuing siege, as the author explains.
From a Superpower perspective, Brzezinski points 
out that the new behave of international actors have 
limitations:
•	 Europe may be competitive in an economic 
level, however, it will be a long time before the 
Europeans get a unity degree that allows them 
compete in a political level;
•	 Japan was for a time thought it will be the next 
“super-state”, but it is already out of this career, 
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and the most probably thing is that China, besi-
des its economic progress, still remains relati-
vely poor, at least during a couple generations 
(in the meantime, it might have to face serious 
political	difficulties);
•	 Russia does not even compete anymore. All its 
possible competitors were eliminated.
It was already questioned and pointed that the United 
States managed constructively its long-term relations 
with the Islamic world and its 1.200 million of men and 
women, in which there is a growing perception that 
the United States is a bitterly hostile power.
For eight years, after the 11-9 tragic events, pre-
vailed throughout this set of imperial ideas, but 
this optic placed the great power in a crossroads: 
global solidarity, transmogrified progressively in 
American isolation.
A few months to change internally because of the 
elections, it came the worst crisis since 1929, when 
the Welfare State again “helps” and avoids a major 
collapse of the world economy in a global crisis re-
cession. Can we say that this is the moment of rup-
tures or transitions, and for new international actors?
GEOPOLITICS OR HEGEMONY
Since the ranking of type of power for Brzezinski, 
based in the cumulative sum of its economic stren-
gth, their budgets and military, their populations 
since 1800, the first five measured positions in 
sequential intervals of twenty years, has been 
shared only with seven States: United States, 
United Kingdom, Germany, France, Russia, Japan 
and China (2005:21), in 1960 the leadership had 
passed to the United States and Russia (USSR), 
with Japan, China and the United Kingdom far 
behind; in 2000, the United States is the only one 
on top, followed far behind by China, Germany, 
Japan and Russia
The author judges that, not even a coalition of 
these countries, highly unlikely given their historical 
conflicts and territorial claims, would have faced 
cohesion, strength and energy needed to move 
United States from its pedestal and maintain global 
stability at the same time.
The new economic centers and the new powers, 
therefore, are missing in this hegemonic center 
optic. The weight that were assumed by China, 
according to its population size impoverished in the 
eighties, its GDP volume, were not in line to become 
an international player in geopolitical changes in 
this new century.
In the other hand, from Wallenstein’s perspective 
(2005), there is a possibility of articulating an Asian 
core, capable of working as a hegemonic center, 
and notes that it depends largely in Japan’s and 
China’s capacity to develop joint strategies, in 
economic complementarities as well as reaching 
strategic  and stable political agreements.
In this sense, Wallerstein suggest an analogy with 
the situation that Germany, France and other big 
European countries, capitalism was founded in the 
postwar that were forced to develop an ambitious 
program of political and economic convergence.
The Japanese recovery has much to do with the 
economic expansion of China and India, which 
signifies in fact the construction of a giant market 
to which direct investments and exports. A good 
indicator of this is that China replaced the United 
States as the main economic partner of Japan.
The XXI century capitalism will have a more dyna-
mic core in Asia. Together with the export growth 
– China has become in the third world export after 
the United States and Germany – the expansion 
of the industrial production, the sustained growth 
of income and the conformation of Chinese capital 
that occupies spaces and products lines of an inter-
mediate technology products in growing segments 
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of the global economy Its being from a regional 
strategy in search of international scenarios. 
In essence, China started in the international circuits 
as an emerging economy, as well as Mexico. Unlike 
South Korea or Brazil, there has been distance of 
strategic sectors. It could combine the five-year 
planning with the Special Economic Zones (SEZ) 
opening, as administrator of the first export plat-
forms, but not to depend on all of its external sec-
tor economy and preserve the State enterprises, 
without temptation to privatize as was performed in 
Mexico, arguing they are a burden and inefficient 
with respect to multinational companies or the 
private sector. The growth was given mainly in the 
manufacturing, but the first modernization should 
be from the agricultural sector (Netzahualcoyotzi, 
& Furlong, 2006)
THE DILEMMAS OF NATIONAL 
INSECURITY
However, without getting to that apocalyptic situa-
tion, safely it will be an expansion of the possible 
scenarios as consequences of international ten-
sions or Manichean passions, among them inclu-
des: (Brzezinski, 2005:31)
1. A strategic central war and enormously destruc-
tive (still feasible at this moment, even though 
improbable) between the United States and 
Russia and, probably in about twenty years or 
less, between the United States and China, as 
well between China and Russia;
2. Major regional wars fought with highly lethal 
weapons, such as between India and Pakistan, 
and between Israel and Iran;
3. Fragmenting ethnic wars, particularly within 
ulti-ethnic States such as Indonesia and India;
4. “National Liberation” Movements of the oppres-
sed, against existing or perceived racial domi-
nation that can take many forms and that may 
occur, for example, between Indians peasants 
in Latin America, the Chechens in Russia or 
the Palestinians against Israel;
5. Suddenly attacks of countries theoretically 
weak that have made to build weapons of mass 
destruction and get lunching systems more or 
less precise, or transports to be utilized against 
their neighbors or, anonymously, against the 
United States;
6. Terrorists attacks increasingly lethal, of clan-
destine groups against targets especially hated 
by them, repeating 11-9, but escalate until 
extend	finally	to	the	use	of	weapons	of	mass	
destruction;
7. Crippling Cyber-attacks committed anon-
ymously by States, terrorist organizations 
or even anarchists individuals, against the 
operative infrastructure of advance societies, 
anchoring them to the case.
Although, both Bush (father) and Clinton, underes-
timated the intensity of the global agitation shock 
wave underlying the protracted conflict with the 
Soviet Union had disappeared.
This agitation – resulting from national and religious 
conflicts, intensified by the growing social impa-
tience generated by various forms of inequality or 
oppression – had been built over many years until 
it was openly expressed, after the end of Cold War. 
Hopeful visions of a new world order or beneficial 
cooperation on a global scale finally died, definitely 
and violently, the 11-9.
Within one year from that date, the next American 
president, George W. Bush had articulated a much 
less rosy future. He also had found a new and de-
finitely concept of Unites States foreign policy: the 
global hegemony in war against terrorism.
The ideas about a cooperative world order give its 
place to the caused concern of “global terrorism”. 
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The globalization headed of the United States, also 
give its place to new “willing coalitions” and to the 
“whom is not with us, is against us” as a new line 
to follow in the global arena.
The programmatic declaration of the CSN ex-
pressed its determination to maintain U.S. military 
superiority, above any other power as their claim 
of strategic right o anticipation to treats by military 
action.
But even President Bush himself, less enthusiastic 
with multilateralism and less optimistic about the 
global situation than his predecessors in office, he 
had to admit that the American power is now exerci-
sed in the context of an emerging global community.
Thereby, even though there was major emphasis 
into global treats facing by the United States, it 
also recognizes the fundamental reality of world 
interdependence. Where is it going to establish 
equilibrium between sovereign hegemony and the 
emerging global community? This continues being 
the U.S. dilemma in the globalization era and re-
gional military projection divided into five strategic 
operating areas (Mesa, 2004):
1. Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM). North 
America
2. Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM): South 
America
3. Pacific Command (USPACOM): Asia and 
Oceania
4. European Command  (USEUCOM): Europe 
and Africa
5. Central Command (USCENTCOM): Northeast 
the Horn of Africa, Arabian Peninsula, Persian 
Gulf and Central Asia.
Which is the strategic meaning of Central Asia?
From a political or historical-cultural perspective to 
another geographic, Central Asia became in the 
arid heart of Eurasian, the most extensive zone in 
the world, where rivers do not end at sea, but lost 
in the desert or flow into lakes terminals (Aral “sea”, 
Caspian “sea”, Balkash Lake or Lop Nor).
Also several researches considerate Central Asia 
in a wider sense and include the rest of Afgha-
nistan, north Pakistan and India, Tibet, Mongolia, 
autonomous Turkic republics of the Russian 
Federation (including Tatarstan) and Azerbaijan 
(Roy, 1977).
STRATEGIC AND ENERGETIC 
INTERESTS: IRAQ, AFGHANISTAN 
AND PAKISTAN
There was a generalized concept and with the 
new Obama’s administration of getting out of 
Iraq: militarily defend its strategy to guarantee the 
superpower idea, but politically is a defeat before 
this Islamic world, which still think in the United 
States hostile to its community that never had treat 
American people.
The U.S. strategic shift to a new flow of recourses, 
30.000 additional soldiers and a tactics change will 
impose to the other partners of the ISAF (OTAN’s 
International Security Assistance Force) a simi-
lar response or, at least, one that fits and do not 
contradict Obama’s will to correct mistakes of the 
previous administration and the shortcomings of 
the previous years.
By the other hand, the Spanish presidency’s po-
sition in the European Union faced big challenges 
in its relation with its south neighbors. They noted 
that the forecast of this year unfinished political and 
economic transitions are mixed – in several cases 
not even started – with regional conflicts of extreme 
difficulty, highlights include: the Arab-Israeli conflict, 
Iraq, Iran (Dúplá, 2010).
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The new American administration had made Afgha-
nistan its international priority. This war is, besides, 
the great risk for foreign politic that must be faced 
by democrats if Obama want to be reelected. 
Vietnam’s fantasy and the failure of the democratic 
political agenda of Lyndon B. Johnson because of 
a distant war-ending, stands in a treating way over 
the present American president and over the public 
debate in the Unites States the next years.
2010, Robles says, will be the year zero for the 
international coalition, in which the stability of all 
region and not only Afghanistan could be jeopar-
dized, along with the NATO’s credibility and U.S. 
leadership itself.
The destabilize power of the Taliban model, in its 
explosive mixture of holy war and insurgent tactics 
is huge, and it comes stronger and more dangerous 
than ever. The abandonment of Afghanistan will not 
just end destroying this country and plunge him into 
another civil war, but would jeopardize all Central 
Asia, beginning with Pakistan and India, Robles says.
The changes in European and American opinions, 
and the logic impatience of ally governments, will 
put in hard doubt the American leadership and its 
capacity to maintain the unity of the coalition and 
to avoid unilateral withdraws. 
The shadow of the neighbor Pakistan, has weighed 
heavily on Afghan destinations. By the European side 
there is not a common position and a strategy towards 
Pakistan. In 2001, this country was an ally and sup-
ported the Taliban. Since then, and with the withdrawal 
of former President Pervez Musharraf (forced by the 
U.S.), Pakistani politics have been conditioned by the 
situation in Afghanistan and its relations with Wash-
ington, besides the traditional alternation between 
military dictatorships and weak civilian governments 
and persistent strategic ambiguity. 
Another element that has changed American inter-
national politics was the unprecedented process 
of its preeminence in the economic world, facing 
political defeat in Iraq, began to collapse parallels 
from the power hegemonic center, which generates 
the world recession from the finance sphere.
THE SECURITY DILEMMA INTERRUPTED: 
GEORGIA – UKRAINE
The Russian invasion to Georgia has not changed 
the power equilibrium in Eurasia. It simply announ-
ced that the balance of power was already changed. 
The Unites States has been absorbed by its wars 
in Iraq and Afghanistan, and by a possible conflict 
with Iran and a destabilizing situation in Pakistan. 
The U.S. do not have ground strategic troops in 
reserve and it is not in situation of intervene in the 
conflict above the Russian periphery. This has pro-
vided an opportunity to reassert Russian influence 
in the former Soviet sphere. Moscow has anything 
to worry about by the possible American or Euro-
pean answer; therefore, the balance of power had 
already been amended and was only a matter of 
the Russian to decide when to do this public. The 
made it the 8th of August. (Friedman, 2008).
RUSSIA VS. WEST
The Unites States is the closest ally to Georgia. 
¿But, what happen with the Orange Revolution in 
Ukraine? From American and European point of 
view, the revolution represented a triumph of de-
mocracy and western influence. From the Russian 
point of view, as Moscow makes it clear, it was an 
intrusion in Ukraine internal affairs, made it by the 
CIA, which aimed to bring Ukraine in NATO and in 
the group of western countries surrounding Russia.
The American presidents, George W. Bush and 
Bill Clinton had promised to Russians that NATO 
will not be extended to the former Soviet empire. 
This promise have already broken in 1998 with the 
inclusion of Poland, Hungary and Czech Republic, 
and once again with the 1994 extension that inclu-
des not only the former Soviet satellites in present 
Central Europe, but also three Baltic States that 
have been part of the USSR.
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Therefore, with the Orange Revolution effects, the 
possible entrance of Ukraine into NATO represen-
ted a treat to Russian national security. It would, 
from this point of view, leaving no chance to Russia 
defends itself and there was a risk to destabilizing 
the Russian Federation itself. As the United States 
went so far as to suggest that Georgia will be ad-
mitted, further extending NATO to Caucasus, the 
Russian conclusions was that Washington preten-
ded surround and dismember Russia.
Another less important event was the decision 
of Europe and the Unites States to support the 
separation of Kosovo from Serbia. Russians was 
friendly with Serbia, but the fundamental situation 
to Russia was if the accepted principle by Europe 
since World War II was, to avoid conflicts, the na-
tional borders will not change. If that principle was 
violated in Kosovo, it could occur in other frontiers, 
including those that claimed its independence from 
Russia. Russians ask in public and in private, not to 
grant official independence to Kosovo but, instead, 
to continue enjoying of an extra official autonomy 
that in practice was the same. Russian positions 
were ignored. 
Following Ukraine experience, the Russians were 
convinced that the Unites States have formed a 
plan to surround Russia in a strategic way and 
fencing completely. Having decide not to respond 
in Kosovo, decided to respond where they had all 
circumstances in favor: South Ossetia.
Moscow had two reasons, the least of which was 
to return what they received in relation to Koso-
vo. If Kosovo could declare independent under 
the protection of the West, then South Ossetia 
and Abkhazia, the two secessionist regions from 
Georgia, could declare independent under Russian 
protection. Any American and European objection 
will confirm duplex. This was important by political 
internal matters of Russia, but the second reason 
was much more important.
The Russian Prime Minister, Vladimir Putin, one oc-
casion said that the fall of the USSR was a geopo-
litical disaster. The first observation will be that this 
point of view don not mean the wish of the return of 
the Soviet system, but that its disintegration have 
originated a situation in which the Russian national 
security seems threatened by western interests 
and possibly China, upon a territory with big con-
nections in the linguistic and cultural sphere, and 
with influence in the great zone from the European 
area, Central Asia and Caucasus. 
The new tsar of the XXI century did not wanted 
to reestablish the USSR, but to reestablish the 
sphere of influence that Russia had in the former 
Soviet zone. To accomplish this objective, it should 
fulfill two tasks. The first one, it had to reestablish 
the Russian army credibility as a combat force, at 
least in its own region. As a second task, it had to 
make it clear that the guarantees offered by the 
West, including been NATO members does not 
mean anything, in front to the Russian power. It 
did not wanted to face NATO in a direct way, but 
it did wanted to face and to defeat a State, which 
was clearly inside Washington’s orbit, with the its 
support, help and consultation, and to cause the 
generalized impression to be under American pro-
tection. Georgia was the perfect option.
By invading Georgia the way Russia did (effective 
if not brilliant), Putin reestablished credibility of the 
Russian army, with a military aiding operation to its 
counterpart, and also with civilians casualties. This 
operation revealed an already know secret: while 
the United States is tight up by the Iraq War and 
now in Afghanistan, the guarantees of American 
security are meaningless. This lesson is not direc-
ted to Americans, is about something that from the 
Russian point of view, the Ukrainians must assume 
and in last April, it was observed with the approval 
of the Rada (Ukranian Parliament) of the perma-
nency of the Russian fleet in Sebastopol, Crimea 
in the next years, in charge of the reduction of the 
54
Raul Netzahualcoyotzi, Aurora Furlong
gas rates, so necessary to economy, particularly 
in the last winters.
Another consequence of the war in Ossetia is a 
warning to Poland and to the Czech Republic, 
with larger dimension to the countries in Central 
Asia and the north Baltic countries. The Czech 
government signs an agreement with the United 
States to establish a ballistic missiles facility, and 
in August, 2008, few days after the beginning of the 
confrontation in Georgia, the Poland government’s 
announce that it will allow the United States to build 
an anti-missile facility in Poland. The agreement 
with Poland was signed in a rush, as a gesture of 
defiance to the Russians. The Russians respond 
with treats that, the secretary of State Condoleezza 
Rice rejected, calling them “bizarre”.
The Russians knew that the United States will de-
nounce their attack. It is something that in fact is in 
favor to the Russians. The more Americans leaders 
talk, the more is the contrast with its lack of action, 
and the Russians want to spread the idea of the 
emptiness of the American guarantees. To the Uni-
ted States, the Middle East is much more important 
than the Caucasus, and Iran is especially important. 
Washington wants Moscow to apply sanctions to Te-
heran. And what is more important, do not want the 
Russians to sell weapons to Iran, especially the air 
defense system S-300, of great efficiency. Georgia 
is a marginal matter to the United States; Iran is a 
fundamental matter. The Russians are in a situation 
to put in serious problems to the United States, not 
only in relation with Iran, but also with the weapons 
sales to other countries like Syria.
In general, the United States can have other ap-
proach: or its strategy is modified and get away of the 
Middle East to focus in the Caucasus and to press 
Iran with other countries, or matches in general with 
Russia in the area, and extending new capabilities 
of the Russian army with the new Russian military 
doctrine and the possibility of strategic defense with 
nuclear vector.
We can point that, since the disintegration of the 
USSR, the Russians as heirs of Eurasia, have 
reformulated not only doctrinally its vital space, but 
Eurasia have to maintain a neutral position of the 
expeditions troops and to depend of the exports of 
Russian energy, supported limited action.
Without been a world power, the new Russian policy 
is rethinking its regional positioning in the north of 
the Caucasus and the Black Sea, particularly with 
the permanence of the Russian fleet in the region.
Particularly there is a new frontier and safeguarding 
of Russian national security, keeping a nuclear sta-
tus, with a new economy despite the effects of the 
world finance crisis, which is impacting more in the 
south of Europe, like Greece.
The war in Georgia, then, is the return of Russia to 
its condition of great power. This is not casual. It has 
been gestating since the moment that Putin took 
power and it is increasing now with new President 
Medvedev.
These favorable events to Russia, linked to the U.S. 
war in Iraq, aiming to be extended to Afghanistan, 
caused more regional imbalance and a major effect 
with the world economic crisis.
The geopolitical bases of the war are present to 
Russia: this new country have been an empire for 
centuries. The new Russia rectifies. The United 
States have made a shift in its foreign policy, is not 
longer the hegemonic country after the fall of the 
Soviet Union and the new international actors search 
a new international equilibrium: multipolarity. 
REFERENCES
Brzezinski, Z. (2005). El Dilema de EE.UU. ¿dominación global o lide-
razgo global?. Paidos, España
Friedman, G. (2008). Georgia y el equilibrio de poder, Política Exterior, 
22(126). 47-56. España.
Robles Fraga, J. M. (2010). Año decisivo para Af-pak.  Política Exterior, 
25(133). 113-122. España
Geopolitics and Eurasia 55
Suma de Negocios, Vol. 3 N° 3: 47-55, Edición Especial 2012, Bogotá (Col.)
Mesa Delmonte, L. I. &  Herrera, R. (2004). Estados Unidos. Prólogo 
para un golpe preventivo. Colegio de San Luis, México.
Michael	T.	K.	(2001),	The	New	Geography	of	Conflict.	Foreign Affairs. 49.
Netzahualcoyotzi, R. & Furlong, A. (2006). La economía china: de la 
región al escenario internacional, BUAP, Montiel & Soriano, México.
Kennedy, P. (1998). Hacia el siglo XXI: Preparing for the twenty-first 
century, Plaza & Janes, Barcelona.
Roy, O. (1997). La nouvelle Asie centrale ou la fabrication des nations, 
París.
Duplá, T. (2010). La Unión Europea y sus vecinos del Sur: agenda eu-
ropea para España. Política Exterior, 25(133). 103-122 
Wallerstein, I. (2005). Análisis de Sistemas-Mundo. Siglo XXI, México
Recibido: 01 de Diciembre de 2011
Aceptado: 15 de Octubre de 2012

